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COMMENTS
CONTRACTS - lLi..EGALITY - COLLATERAL AGREEMENTS UNDER
HoME OWNERS' LoAN AcT - In transactions under the Home Owners' Loan Act 1 it is customary for the holder of the mortgage on the
property on which a new loan is sought to agree with the H. 0. L. C.
to accept in full settlement of his claim bonds of the H. 0. L. C. of a
face value often tinies less than the amount of the obligation secured
by the old ·mortgage. However, not infrequently the mortgagee also
exacts from the home owner a collateral agreement under which the
home owner gives him a new second mortgage on the property as
1 48 Stat. L. 128 (1933), as amended by 48 Stat. L. 648 (1934); 49 Stat. L.
296 (1935), 53 Stat. L. 1403 (1939); 12 U. S. C. (1934)', § 1461-1468 and
supplements.
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security for an undertaking to pay the balance of the old obligation or
some part thereof or to cover the difference between the face value
and the market value of the bonds received. Whether he may lawfully do this is a question that has been presented for decision to the
courts of at least fifteen states.2 Of interest, therefore, is the decision of
the Supreme Court of California in the case of McAllister v. Drapea-u,8
in which the court, by reversing the decision of the district court of
appeals/ erases from the judicial slate the single dissent from the
proposition that such collateral agreements are unenforceable unless
there is proper disclosure to the H. 0. L. C. of the existence of the
agreement. The writer wishes to consider (I) the bases for holding that
such collateral agreements are unenforceable; (2) whether the home
owner can sue for affirmative relief in regard to the collateral agreement; and .(3) the effect of disclosure to the H. 0. L. C. of the
existence of the collateral agreement.
I.

The purpose of these collateral agreements is to indemnify the lienholder against possible losses as a result of taking the H. 0. L. C.
bonds in satisfaction of the original mortgage.11 As suggested above,
2 Jcssewich .v. Abbene, 154 Misc. 768, 277 N. Y. S. 599 (1935); First Citizens
Bank & Trust Co. v. Speaker, 159 Misc. 427, 287 N. Y. S. 831 (1936); Chaves
County Bldg. &· Loan Assn. v. Hodges, 40 N. M. 326, 59 P. (2d) 671 (1936);
Stager v. Junker, 14 N. J. Misc. 913, 188 A. 440 (1936); Cook v. Donner, 145
Kan. 674, 66 P. (2d) 587 (1937); Pye v. Grunert, 20] Minn. 191, 275 N. W.
615, 276 N. W. 221 (1937); Meek v. Wilson, 283 Mich. 679, 278 N. W. 731
(1938); Anderson v. Horst, 132 Pa. Super. 140, 200 A. 721 (1938); Heath v.
Huffman, (Tenn. App. 1938) 127 S. W. (2d) 282; Hays v. Commerce Union
Bank, (Tenn. App. Nashville) (not reported) cited by Payne, "Enforceability of
Agreements between Mortgagors of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation and Third
Parties," 45 W. VA. L. Q, 332 at 333, note 7 (1939); McAllister v. Drapeau, (Cal.
1939) 92 p; (2d) 911, reversing (Cal. App. 1938) 85 P. (2d) 523; Markowitz v.
Berg, 125 N. J. Eq. 56, 4 A. (2d) 410 (1939); Home Owners' Loan Corp. v.
Aiello, (R. I. 1939) 5 A. (2d) 649; Keystone Bank of Spangler v. Booth, 334 Pa.
545, 6 A. (2d) 417 (1939); Council v. Cohen, (Mass. 1939) 21 N. E. (2d) 96n
Sirman v. Sloss Realty Co., (Ark. 1939) 129 S. W. (2d) 602; McCrory v. Smeltzer,
(Tex. Comm. App. 1939) 124 S. W. (2d) 336 (involves the same problem with the
Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation); Dayton Mtg. & Inv. Co. v. Theis, (Ohio App.
1939) 23 N. E. (2d) 511, cited in McAllister v. Drapeau, supra, 92 P. (2d) at 916;
Johnson v. Matthews, (Ill. App. 1939) 22 N. E. (2d) 772.
8 (Cal. 1939) 92 P. (2d) 911.
'(Cal. App. 1938) 85 P. (2d) 523.
11 Since the H. 0. L. C. will only allow a new mortgage up to So% of the
appraised value of the property, there are many instances in which the H. 0. L. C.
bonds do not equal the balance of the original mortgage. See Wallace, "Survey of
Federal Legislation Affecting Private Home Financing Since 1932," 5 LAw &
CoNTEM, PROB. 481 at 489 ff. (1938).
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the sum necessary for such indemnity is usually computed on the basis
of the amount of the original mortgage less the amount of the bonds
to be given or already given to the mortgagee, but in some cases it is
measured by the difference between the par value of the bonds and
their present cash value. If it is the latter, there is no difficulty in
holding the collateral agreements illegal and void, for section 8 ( e)
of the Home Owners' Loan Act 6 provides that "No person ... shall
•.• contract for ... payment of any difference which may exist between
the market value and the par value of the bonds of the Home Owners'
Loan Corporation," and makes violation of this provision a penal
offense.
But where the collateral agreement is to make up the unpaid balance of the original mortgage, the solution is not so easy. There is
nothing in the Home Owners' Loan Act itself which specifically prohibits this type of agreement. The declared purpose of the act is of no
assistance, for it simply states that the act was passed:
"to provide emergency relief with respect to home mortgage indebtedness to refinance home mortgages, to extend relief to the
owners of homes occupied by them and who are unable to amortize
their debt elsewhere..•." 1
However, some of the courts have seized upon section 8 (a) 8 as a
basis for declaring the collateral agreement illegal and void. This section provides:
''Whoever makes any statement, knowing it to be false . . .
for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of the Home
Owners' Loan Corporation ... shall be punished by a fine ... or
imprisonment .•• or both."
The false statement, according to the courts, is the promise in the
''bond consent" 9 submitted to the H. 0. L. C. by the ~ienholder, to
This clause was added by 49 Stat. L. 298 (1935), 12 U. S. C. (Supp. 1938),
§ 1467 (e).
1 Title of act, 48 Stat. L. 128 (1933).
8 48 Stat. L. 134, 12 U. S. C. (1934), § 1467 (a).
9 "Bond consent" refers to the mortgagee's consent to take bonds, the legal
, significance of which will be explained infra. In the "bond consent" form used until
1935 there was no specific reference to second mortgages, but after January 31, 1935,
at which time· the larger portion of the lending -had been consummated, the "bond
consent" contained the following provision: "The undersigned represents that he will
not require of the applicant any second mortgage or other instrument evidencing any
portion of the aforesaid obligation or the payment of any money or other additional
consideration except only as follows ..••" This pro,,ision should certainly strengthen the
case for the home owner. The form of the bond consent is set out in full in Pavne,
"Enforceability of Agreements Between Mortgagors of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation and Third Parties," 45 W. VA, L. Q. 332 at 338 (1939).
6
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accept in "full settlement" of his claim the bonds of the H. 0. L. C.
and to release all of his claims against the property of the home owner.
This promise is made despite the fact that a collateral agreement for a
second lien on the land has already been executed or is contemplated.
This immediately raises the question whether a promise of future
performance made with a present intention not to perform comes within
the scope of a "false statement'' as used in the statute.10 But, even assuming that such a promise can be regarded as a "false statement,"
how can the fact that there was a false statement made in violation of
the statute a:ffect the validity of the collateral agreement? The statute
simply prohibits and punishes for false statements made to the H. 0.
L. C. regarding such matters as collateral agreements, value of home,
amount of the mortgage, etc. However the statute in no way prohibits
the existence of collateral agreements. Consequently, to hold a collateral agreement void as a violation of section 8 (a) seems a bit tenuous.
Another approach often used by the courts is suggested by section
4 (k) 11 which empowers the board to:
"make such bylaws, rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the
provisions in this section, as may be necessary for the proper conduct of the affairs of the Corporation."
In accordance with this rule-making power the board has passed several
resolutions dealing with collateral agreements for second mortgages
on the home owner's property.12 They provide, in substance, that second
mortgages for excess indebtedness over and above that which the corporation can refund are permitted only in limited cases and then only
on a basis which assures a reasonable probability that the home owner
will be able to pay his full obligation to the corporation and also meet
the terms of the second mortgage indebtedness. While these resolutions
do not prohibit collateral agreements, courts feel that a full disclosure
of the amount and the terms of the proposed second lien is impliedly
required by the H. 0. L. C. so that it can determine whether the second
mortgage complies with the regulations. Since these regulations are
considered to have the force and effect of the statute itself,13 it is
10 A large -number of modern cases have allowed damages in deceit or rescission
where promises of future performance have been made with a present intention not to
perform. Cases are collected in 51 A. L. R. 46 (1927); 68 A. L. R. 635 (1930);
91 A. L. R. 1295 (1934).
11 48 Stat. L. 132 (1933), 12 U.S. C. (1935), § 1463 (k).
12 See resolutions quoted in McAllister v. Drapeau, (Cal. 1939) 92 P. (2d) 9u
at 914. Since there have been several resolutions by the board on this question, the
provisions of each of which are slightly different, it is well to note which resolutions
were in effect at the time of the execution of the agreement between the H. 0. L. C.
and the lienholder.
13 McAllister v. Drapeau, (Cal. 1939) 92 P. (2d) 911.
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thought that the execution of a second lien without such disclosure is
a violation of the letter and spirit of the statute. But is disclosure impliedly necessary under the regulations of the board? It seems reasonable to believe that the board would have specifically required disclosure had it desired it. Perhaps the board felt that it was really the
function of the courts to decide whether the collateral agreements complied with its regulations when litigation arose over the validity of
such agreements. Certainly the interests of the H. 0. L. C. would be
adequately protected in such a case, for if the court decided that the
second lien conformed to the regulations, the H. 0. L. C. could not
be prejudiced thereby, and if it did not conform thereto, the second
lien would be illegal and void as a violation of the terms of the statute.
Though there is no express recital in the act itself of the underlying
legislative policy,14 most of the courts buttress their decisions by reference to what they feel is the general public policy behind the act. The
theory is that the act was intended solely for the benefit of home owners
who were in financial di:fficulties.15 From this it is argued that to allow
the exaction of a secret second lien would "interfere by trickery with
this corporation [H. 0. L. C.] 's collecting its bonds, and the government's financial assistance would merely delay the inevitable foreclosure suit which it meant to prevent." 18 The second mortgagee would
thereby receive benefits never intended for him; i.e., although he has
received guaranteed tax exempt bonds in discharge of the original
mortgage, yet by foreclosure of the second mortgage he may obtain the
property of the mortgagor, subject only to the very favorable first
mortgage held by the H. 0. L. C.
On the other hand, one might suggest that although the purpose
of the act was to assist the home owner, it was not intended to exonerate
him completely from his just debts at the expense of his creditors; that
the act was simply intended to enable the home owner to refund his
debt and to place the first lien on his property in the hands of the
H. 0. L. C. The fact that neither the act nor the regulations absolutely
prohibits second liens adds weight to this suggestion.11
Turning now from the act itself as a basis for decision to the nature
of the relationship between the parties arising out of the promise of the
14

The writer has reference here to such express declarations af policy as are set

forth in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. L. 70 (1932.), and the National Labor

Relations Act; 49 Stat. L. 449 ( I 93 5). Of course, an inkling as to the policy of the
H. 0. L. C. might be obtained from the declared purpose as set out in the act. See
supra, at note 7.
15 Meek v. Wilson, 2.83 Mich. 679, 2.78 N. W. 731 (1938).
18 Jessewich v. Abbene, 154 Misc. 768 at 770, 2.77 N. Y. S. 599 (i935).
11 For other arguments of the same tenor, see McAllister v. Drapeau, (Cal. App.
1938) 85 P. (2d) 52.3, revd. 92. P. (2d) 911.
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lienholder to the H. 0. L. C., it seems that the home owner could be
relieved from the collateral agreement by reference to the law of contracts relating to third party beneficiaries.18 Undoubtedly the lienholder by the "bond consent" is properly to be regarded as making an
offer to the H. 0. L. C. This offer calls for an act as acceptance on the
part of the H. 0. L. C. The offer, which also constitutes the consideration for the contract,19 consists of a promise by the lienholder to the
H. 0. L. C. to accept its bonds and to give a full release of his claim
against the property of the home owner in return for the act of the
H. 0. L. C. in giving him its bonds. But in these cases involving collateral agreements, the bonds of the H. 0. L. C. often times are not
sufficient to pay off the original claim of the lienholder. In view of the
rule of law in most states to the effect that the payment of a smaller
sum in satisfaction of a larger sum is not a good discharge of a debt,2°
is there actually consideration? Apparently so, for the payment here
is by a third party with an understanding by the parties that it should
be in full satisfaction of the obligation of the home owner, and is thus
equivalent to an accord and satisfaction.21 Also, the medium of payment
is different from that contemplated in the original obligation, i.e., it
consists of bonds of the H. 0. L. C. Hence there is an enforceable contract between the H. 0. L. C. and the original lienholder for the
benefit of the home owner. In other words, the home owner is a third
party beneficiary of the contract and in most states he can enforce this
contract for his benefit.22
Therefore, by asserting his rights as a third party beneficiary of
the contract between the H. 0. L. C. and the lienholder in which the
latter has agreed to release all claims against his property, the home
owner is relieved of the collateral agreement.
However, when the collateral agreement is made after rather than
before the above transaction is completed, there might be some question
as to whether the home owner has not renounced his rights as a con18 None of the courts, however, have utilized this theory, which seems like a
simple and sound basis for decision. Some courts have referred to this three-cornered
transaction as a novation. See Anderson v. Horst, 132 Pa. Super. 140, 200 A. 721
(1938). Others. have referred to it as a release. See Cook v. Donner, 145 Kan. 674,
66 P. (2d) 587 (1937).
19
l CoNTRACTs RESTATEMENT, § 75 (1932). Also, 1 W1tLISToN, CoNTRACTS,
rev. ed., § 102 (1936).
zo ANSON, CoNTRACTS, § 140 (1930),
21
ANSON, CoNTRACTS 148, note 3 (1930); l W1tLISTON, CoNTRAcTS, rev. ed.,
§§ 121, 125 (1936); 2 CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 421 (1932); Jessewich v.
Abbene, 154 Misc. 768, 277 N. Y. S. 599 (1935); McAllister v. Drapeau, {Cal.
1939) 92 P. (2d) 91 l.
22
ANSON, CONTRACTS, § 284 (1930); 2 W1LL1STON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §
356 (1936).

MICHIGAN

I.Aw REvrnw

[ Vol. 38

tract beneficiary 23 and therefore is not relieved from the collateral
agreement.
2.

Though the courts agree that where the· lienholder sues on the
collateral agreement the home owner can set up the defense of illegality, there is some doubt as to whether the home owner has any right
to affirmative relief against the collateral agreement. In Anderson 'V.
Horst 2 ' the home owner was denied the right to recover money paid
under the collateral agreement on the theory that he was in pari
delicto with the lienholder as regards the illegal collateral agreement.
But in the same case the home owner was grap.ted affirmative relief
as to the setting aside of the illegal agreement. In McAllister -v.
Drapeau 211 and Meek -v. Wilson, 26 the court allowed recovery of the
money paid under the collateral agreement on the theory that the
parties were not in pari delicto. The question whether the home owner
was in pari delicto with the lienholder in executing the collateral agreement becomes important, therefore, in cases where the home owner is
seeking affirmative relief; e.g., asking to have his notes surrendered
and cancelled and the lien securing them removed from the records,
seeking to recover money paid under the void agreement, suing to
enjoin enforcement of or to cancel the collateral agreements, etc.
Looking at the circumstances surrounding the execution of these collateral agreements, it does not seem that the parties ~e actually in
pari delicto. 21 Usually the lienholder has started or is threatening foreclosure proceedings, thus forcing the home owner either to et?-ter into
the collateral agreement or lose his home. This amounts to a form of
undue influence 28 which should be sufficient to negative the idea of .pari
delicto.

3.
In at least two of the states where secret collateral agreements
have been held illegal and void, the court has enforced the collateral
agreement where there was a disclosure to the H. 0. L. C. of its exist29

28 For a complete discussion of the contractual elements involved, see Payne,
''Enforceability of Agreements between Mortgagors of the Home Owners' Loan
Corporation and Third Parties," 45 W. VA. L. Q. 332 (1939).
H 132 Pa. Soper. 140, 200 A. 721 (1938).
211 (Cal. i939) 92 P. (2d) 911.
26 283 Mich. 679, 278 N. W. 731 (1938).
27 Council v•. Cohen, (Mass. 1939) 21 N. E. (2d) 967.
28 In general, see Wallace, "Survey of Federal Legislation Affecting Private
Home Financing Since 1932," 5 LAW & CoNTEM. PROB. 481 at 489 (1938).
29 Ridge Investment Corp. v. Nicolosi, 15 N. J. Misc. 569,193 A. 710 (1937);
Bay City Bank v. White, 283 Mich. 267, 277 N. W. 888 (1938). See also, Sirman
v. Sloss Realty Co., (Ark. 1939) 129 S. W. (2d) 602, to the same effect, though there
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ence. The-theory is that if the H. 0. L. C. knew of the collateral agreement at the time of its agreement with the lienholder it has accepted
the collateral agreement as a part of the whole transaction. The question of disclosure is therefore an important consideration in determining
the validity of these agreements. The requirement of disclosure is a
concomitant of the theory of the courts that the talring a second mortgage by the lienholder is not a matter of right, but one of privilege to
be granted by the H. 0. L. C.80 There are a number of possible ways
in which this disclosure may be attempted. One method is simply to
note on the "bond consent" the fact that a second mortgage has been
or is to be taken by the lienholder. This was held to be a sufficient disclosure to the H. 0. L. C. in Sirman 'V, Sloss Realty Co. 81 The disclosure might be made to the officials or employees of the H. 0. L. C.,
in which case the question of the authority of the agent notified becomes important since disclosure to an agent with limited authority is
not attributable to the principal where the limited authority does not
extend to the matter disclosed.82 Or the disclosure may be to the fee
attorney (dosing attorney) of the H •. 0. L. C. In Ridge Investment
Corp. v. Nicolosi 88 the collateral agreement was held valid because it
was prepared in the office of the dosing attorney, a circumstance deemed
sufficient to spell out notice to the H. 0. L. C. But in Markowitz 'V,
Berg st and Council v. Cohen 85 such disclosure was held not to constitute proper notice. 88 Disclosure might also take the form of a written
document in the H. 0. L. C. file of the home owner. Such disclosure
was held to be notice to the H. 0. L. C. in Bay City Bank v. White, 81
What would otherwise be adequate disclosure to validate the collateral agreement may be inoperative because not made at the proper
time. The time of disclosure is important in every case because of the
have been no decisions in the jurisdiction as to the effect if the second mortgage were
kept secret.
,
80 McAllister v. Drapeau, (Cal. 1939) 92 P. (2d) 9n.
81
(Ark. 1939) 129 S. W. (2d) 602.
82 MECHEM, AGENCY, 3d ed., § 488 (1923); Trentor v. Pothen, 46 Minn.
298, 49 N. W. 129 (1891).
88
15 N. J. Misc. 569, 193 A. 710 (1937).
H 125 N. J. Eq. 56, 4 A. (2d) 410 (1939).
85
(Mass. 1939) 21 N. E. (2d) 967.
88 In view of the fact that the HoME OWNERS' LoAN CoRPORATION, MANUAL OF
RuLES AND REGULATIONS, c. 6, § 1-d (2), specifies that "Fee attorneys are not employees of this corporation and shall be paid on a fee basis," that all officials of the
H. 0. L. C. with authority to pass on a loan are on a salary basis and, that the duties
of the fee attorney include only the examination of titles, preparation of title reports
and dosing of loans, this seems to be the sounder view. The section of the Manual
is quoted by Payne, "Enforceability of Agreements between the Home Owners' Loan
Corporation and Third Parties," 45 W. VA. L. Q. 332 at 349, note 85 (1939).
87
283 Mich. 267, 277 N. W. 888 (1938).
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peculiar circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract between the lienholder and the H. 0. L. C. As we have already seen,
when the lienholder submits his "bond consent" to the H. 0. L. C.
"consenting'' to release all claims against the home owner's property,
it is in the nature of an offer, and, as such, it can be varied in any way
before acceptance. This means that if the lienholder properly discloses
his intent to take ·a second mortgage before the H. 0. L. C.'s act of acceptance, the terms of the offer ("bond consent") are altered so as to
allow the second mortgage. So when the H. 0. L. C. later accepts the
offer it accepts it in the altered form. When the "bond consent" (offer)
is submitted to the H. 0. L. C., it is always necessary for the officers
to investigate the home owner's status in order to determine his right
to relief. As a consequence, it is usual to include in the "bond consent"
(offer) an additional promise in terms to keep the offer open for a
specific period as a safeguard to the H. 0. L. C. once it starts Jo investigate in reliance on the offer. As soon as the H. 0. L. C. has started
the investigation leading to acceptance, it is arguable that there is a
consideration for this promise and, as a result, there is an option.81
This means that the offer cannot be withdrawn once the H. 0. L. C.
has started to act, and since the offe,r cannot be withdrawn, it cannot be
changed.89 So disclosure of the collateral agreement during this period
has no effect on the terms of the offer. But if the option expires without acceptance then disclosure will be e:ffective.'0
Roy L. Steinheimer

88 l WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed.,§§ 61, 112, 139, 140 (1936); I CoN'IRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 90 (1932).
,
89 ANSON, CONTRACTS 55, note 2 (1930). Sec also Chaves County Bldg. & Loan
Assn. v. Hodges, 40 N. M. 326, 59 P. (2d) 671 (1936), in which the court refused
to allow parol evidence to show that agents of the H. 0. L. C. were notified as to the
collateral agreement. Thus the parol evidence rule may provoke added difficulties.
40 I WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 72 (1936).

